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 1. Introduction 
The emergence of private actors in setting standards and sometimes contributing to monitoring and 
enforcement functions is a key feature of contemporary transnational regulation.  Transnational 
private regulation fills significant gaps in governmental and inter-governmental capacity, offering the 
potential of public goods which both provide some coordination for global markets and address 
some of the externalities such as environmental degradation and exploitation of workers. 
The establishment of independent state regulatory agencies with responsibilities for monitoring and 
enforcing rules is the classic mode of regulation referred to in literatures on the rise of the 
regulatory state.2 Following this approach an analysis of the emergent private authority will classify 
the phenomena in terms first of the variety of non-state actors assuming authority positions in 
contemporary governance arrangements and second the nature and extent of modes for exercising 
authority which deviate from the exercise of regulatory authority through delegation of powers by 
public law instruments. The significance of these governance trends may be evaluated by moving 
beyond a taxonomical approach to consider the transnational reach of much contemporary private 
authority, in particular the deployment  of market  mechanisms (both contractual and non-
contractual,) and community-based modes of governing (for example self-regulation). Whilst 
transnational private regulation has attracted significant attention over recent years, distinctive 
feature of the research from which this article is drawn include a consideration of the mixed public 
and private participation in many regimes and a move beyond considering the variety of actors and 
modes involved in standard setting to consider also the central importance of mechanisms of 
monitoring and enforcement. When considered as involving not only private standard setting 
capacity, but also monitoring and enforcement activity, the significance of transnational private 
regulation becomes more evident.   
Transnational private regulation requires normative evaluation in respect of the legitimacy attaching 
to the effects of such private authority in relation to government. To what extent does transnational 
private regulation advance public and/or private interests and, in the absence of a direct link to 
democratic governance, what are its sources of legitimacy? To put the question another way, is 
transnational private regulation merely a technical exercise of authority or does it create sites of 
political contestation and battles over interests. Issues concerning environmental protection and 
labour rights provided the more obvious sites of contestation. 3 Recent analysis of more technical 
areas of transnational private rule making suggests the struggle between interests, even when 
clothed in technical language, is more universal.4  
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2. Taxonomies of Private Authority 
The primary focus of this article is on the emergence and nature of private authority within 
transnational governance regimes. Recognition of the importance of private authority in governance 
is not new. Robert Hale, writing as long ago as 1923, argued that the protection of property rights by 
the state gave power to the controllers of those rights.5 That power includes giving rights to others 
in respect of the property. He showed that property rights lie behind the power of employers to 
regulate their employees, of landowners to coerce tenants and of producers of goods to apply 
conditions to their acquisition by consumers. Equally the owner of wealth can apply conditions to its 
disbursement whether in purchase of goods or services or employment of workers. 6 A key 
mechanism for the exercise of that coercive capacity associated with property rights is the contract. 
In this context the establishment of a contract may have the effect of creating a relationship which is 
more hierarchical than is normally implied by theories of consent-based transactions. 7 This basic 
insight is central to the capacity of non-state actors to establish private regulatory regimes. A variety 
of non-state actors are involved, including businesses, associations of businesses, but also non-
governmental organisations seeking to advance particular ideals such as labour rights and protection 
of the environment. 
For businesses the globalization of markets has increased the needs of multinational enterprises to 
deploy property rights for regulatory rather than transactional purposes. In particular, forms of 
standardization have been required for a number of reasons.8 Standardization has permitted 
purchasing of components across global markets with reassurance that, for example, parts 
manufactured in different parts of the world can be effectively assembled to meet expectations. As 
legislative requirements for products have become increasingly general, private standards have 
become a key instrument for satisfying national regulatory requirements. The so-called ‘new 
approach to technical harmonization’ pioneered in the European Union in the 1980s is a core 
example of this trend. 9  
The primary instrument through which a requirement to meet standards is applied, for example to 
product suppliers, is through contracts, at the choice of one party (or both parties). We may think of 
the regulatory activity as transnational when, de facto, it crosses national boundaries either in the 
setting of standards (as with the many standards bodies drawing members from two or more 
countries), or when contractual commitments lead to the implementation of standards across 
national borders. In practice, of course, both the setting and implementation of standards crosses 
borders in many instances. Whilst the origins of many of these business standards were self-
regulatory, in the sense that particular businesses cooperated in establishing the standards to apply 
to their markets, the scale to the activity increasingly detaches the standard setting from the 
businesses who may adopt the standards. In such cases the testing point for the standard will lie in 
decisions by businesses, for market reasons, to adopt standards. 
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In the case of over-the-counter derivatives (OTC) transactions, standards have been set through a 
Master Agreement developed by technical committees of the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA), a membership organisation of leading banks. The Master Agreement is, in 
essence, a boilerplate contract, permitting banks to enter transactions by reference to a set of 
standard and widely understood terms (with or without amendment for the particular transaction) 
rather than negotiate terms afresh for each contract, reducing both cost and risks of uncertainty.10 
By contrast with standards, codes of practice or conduct typically have rather different origins, 
emerging from networks of businesses, public sector bodies or NGOs which constitute a form of 
community concerned to lay down standards of conduct for participants in particular markets. More 
effective codes back the standards up with their own provision for monitoring and enforcement or 
by requiring adherents to the code to establish their own capacity for these purposes. The precise 
legal basis for such codes varies, sometimes being linked to the establishment of an association and, 
in other cases, a collective contract between business members.  
But businesses are not the only actors engaged in such transnational codes. The coercive power of 
wealth is not limited to large firms or individuals with whom wealth is concentrated, but may also be 
aggregated amongst numerous potential purchasers of products. It is this potential which is 
harnessed by NGOs involved in setting standards for such matters as sustainable forestry and fair 
trade, who are then able to persuade businesses to implement the standards, again through their 
supply chain contracts. In such regimes of ‘non-state market driven governance’ the adoption of 
NGO codes by businesses is legally a voluntary matter, undertaken with an eye to enhancing 
reputation and thus market position.11 Contracts are typically deployed by adherents to promote 
compliance up and down supply chains. 
The architecture of regimes involving codes with transnational reach is often complex. In the case of 
the international standards developed for advertising from the 1930s by the International Chamber 
of Commerce, the norms developed have been given effect to by national self-regulatory 
organisations operating as associations constituted by advertising industry members or through 
collective contracts between such members. This national self-regulation has had a significant 
degree of steering by the European Advertising Standards Alliance, a membership organisation 
comprising initially the SROs and, more recently, also associations representing the advertising 
industry directly.12 EASA initially developed the architecture for handling cross-border complaints 
about advertising in the EU and now produces Best Practice Recommendations which are widely 
followed by SROs as a source of learning and also direction for newly established regimes within the 
EU.  
The setting of standards, without more, does not of itself indicate the existence of a regulatory 
regime. It is widely accepted within the regulatory literature that regulation comprises processes for 
setting the norms or objectives of the regime, mechanisms for detecting or feeding back information 
about compliance and deviation from the norms, and apparatus for correcting deviations (for 
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example through enforcement.13 Whilst the processes for setting of standards have, in many cases, 
become increasingly transparent, mechanisms of monitoring and enforcement which are rooted in 
contractual relationships are liable to be relatively opaque. A key legitimacy issue for transnational 
private regulatory regimes concerns the capacity and commitment for reporting on compliance with 
standards or codes, a matter a turn to in the next section. 
3. Legitimacy of Private Authority 
Because of a widely accepted linkage between legitimate governance and democratic politics, 
private regulatory regimes face significant legitimacy challenges. Famously Adam Smith hinted that 
business people could not communicate over any matters without the risk they would seek to 
establish some form of cartel.14 The suspicion that self-regulation by businesses is liable to be 
animated by private rather than public interest considerations persists. With NGO activity, by 
contrast, there is a tendency to assume that regulatory activity is motivated by good intentions, 
whether or not the capacity to be effective is present.15 
The principal normative challenges presented by transnational private regulation include the implicit 
or explicit delegation of key governance functions to non-state actors, and the effects of regimes for 
the public interest and private interests. Whilst delegation to private actors is an important issue, it 
is inextricably bound up also with an evaluation of the quality of the mechanisms through which 
such private regulation is undertaken.  Though the deployment of contracts as instruments of 
regulation raise few issues in principle, since states also frequently make use of such instruments, 
there is a need to scrutinise and evaluate the detailed mechanisms for setting norms, and also for 
detecting deviations and ensuring compliance. In some instances we might treat this a matter for the 
market. If components supplied are not compliant with the appropriate standard the parties are 
likely to find some solution to the problem, whether by invoking the provisions of the supply 
contract or otherwise . Where public and private interests are clearly aligned then it may be 
sufficient to leave it to market mechanisms to determine which private regulatory regimes survive. 
But the idea of purely technical regimes which do not affect interests has been questioned.16 
One way to address this legitimacy deficit for private regulation is to point out that public agencies 
central to many public regulatory regimes derive a substantial portion of their legitimacy from their 
technical capacity, the quality of their outputs and even their insulation from electoral politics. 
Insulation from electoral politics is identified as a key structural factor in establishing the credible 
commitment of regulators to reasonable stability in their actions and reducing vulnerability to 
interventions driven by short terms political requirements rather than the long term stability of the 
regulated sector.17 Such arguments, that regulators in some spheres should be evaluated by 
reference to substantive or output measures rather than procedural or input considerations may 
certainly go some way towards supporting their legitimacy, but are rarely likely to be sufficient. 
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Whilst the substantive legitimacy arguments may have some weight in many regimes, legitimacy 
may also derive from linkages to democratic governance institutions. The relationship between 
private regulatory regimes and the state has a number of potential forms .Where the state is 
involved in initiating, approving or adopting private regulatory instruments we may refer to this as a 
form of co-regulation.18 Any of these connections may be achieved formally, through legislation, or 
informally through encouragement, and in the case of approval, through inaction.  
Where governments or inter-governmental bodies make decisions to initiate private regulation they 
may either offer informal encouragement or a statutory mandate for the activity. Though 
governmental actors may remain in the background the fact of governmental initiative implies a 
continuing role in monitoring the regime and, potentially acting if it is defective. Much discussed 
regimes of press self-regulation in the United Kingdom and in Ireland were initiated with 
government encouragement, informally in the UK, and with a form of statutory approval by a 
minister in Ireland.19 
In the case of private regulation of print advertising regulation in the UK the regime administered by 
the Advertising Standards Authority was apparently established by the industry for its own reasons 
concerned with protecting its reputation, but its standards and structure have been amended on a 
number of occasions with encouragement from government. Thus government observed and 
implicitly delegated responsibility to the private regime, but also sought to steer it towards meeting 
public objectives through threatening statutory intervention, ‘bargaining in the shadow of 
hierarchy’.20 With the ASA there is also an example of explicit delegation as the statutory regulator, 
the Office of Communications (OFCom) decided to allocate responsibility for broadcast advertising 
to the private regulator also, with provision for backstop enforcement powers to be retained by the 
public agency.21 In the case of regulation of Online Behavioural  Advertising in the EU, the initiative 
has been taken by the industry working with the European Advertising Standards Alliance, but with 
the involvement and encouragement of the European Commission. It is at least implicit that the Best 
Practice Recommendations produced by EASA in 2011 will, if effectively implemented by national 
self-regulatory organisations across the EU, offer a form of delegated regime within the EU.22 
The European Union has many examples of different forms for giving effect to private regulation. 
The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, for example, includes measures which give legal and 
regulatory effect to private codes. The Directive provides for penalties on traders for failure to follow 
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a code to which they claim adherence.23 Civil or criminal penalties are applicable for breach of this 
provision throughout the EU. With technical standards a number of EU measures specify general 
standards which may be complied with through adherence to technical standards produced by 
European or national standards bodies, for example with consumer products. The General Product 
Safety Directive requires that all products put on to the European market shall be safe.24 Safety may , 
in the absence of more specific legal instruments, be demonstrated by conformance with voluntary 
national standards complying with private European standards.25 In this way EU legislation effective 
adopts European and national technical standards as an aspect of compliance with general rules.  
In the EU examples noted in the previous paragraph, norms are set privately through codes or 
technical standards, but then monitored and enforced as part of public enforcement regimes. In the 
case of OTC derivatives the norms are set down privately in the Master Agreement and also 
monitored and enforced privately by the parties to the agreement. There is, however, some 
relationship to state regulators, both through implicit decisions not to impose public regulation 
(though those decisions has come under pressure following the global financial crisis) and also in 
some states through the willingness of national legislative bodies to adopt legislation to align 
national law with the expectations as to enforceability of contractual terms provided for in the 
Master Agreement. For example, an Irish minister stated that the adoption by the Irish legislature of 
ISDA’s master legislation which, amongst other things disapplied aspects of gaming legislation to 
derivatives transactions, was undertaken to encourage a major bank to establish itself in Ireland 
without uncertainties as to the effects of the ISDA Master Agreement. Similar processes of legislative 
alignment with ISDA norms have occurred in a number of other jurisdictions.26 Thus some degree of 
legitimation may be achieved through linkage to the actions of elected governments, but without 
necessarily being sufficient to satisfy the demands of the legitimacy environment. 
Whether or not there is link to public governance institutions, the legitimacy of private regulators 
may be evaluated in part by reference to processes adopted which may mirror or substitute for the 
processes of democratic governance. Mirroring might involve private regulators emulating 
administrative law norms involving rights of those affected by the regime to hearings, opportunities 
to make comments, and rights of appeal.27 Substitutional processes might involve different 
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mechanisms for building some form of demos and the means to engage it processes over reflection 
not only on what rules to adopt but also more fundamental issues concerning the ethos and 
purposes of the regime. Paying attention to such processes is part of a wider pattern of managing 
regulatory legitimacy which has frequently seen regulators, public and private,  innovating 
effectively in developing principles both of transparency in participation in their processes.28 Where 
government approval for private regulators is absent or insufficient, the potential for such active 
engagement with legitimating strategies is likely to be of particular importance. Equally the more the 
regulatory sphere is seen as contested as opposed to technical, the more significance is likely to 
attach to processes. 
In addition to processes, private regulators might also pay attention to mechanisms of 
accountability. Reactive forms of accountability include rights of complaint and appeal. More 
proactive forms include the establishment of mechanisms of scrutiny of the quality and effects of 
regimes, equivalent to better regulation policies adopted in most OECD member states.  These are 
forms of meta-regulation – structures for steering or regulating self-regulatory capacity29, well suited 
to providing oversight and reassurance about the quality and appropriateness of transnational 
private regulation30. A key example of such a meta-regulatory approach to oversight of private 
regimes has emerged in the labelling sector where the ISEAL Alliance has progressively produced a 
series of codes applying to their member organisations which are private regulators. The ISEAL 
Codes of Good Practice address minimum standards for such matter as standard setting, assurance 
and the measurement of impacts of regimes which it effectively oversees. 31 The ISEAL Codes thus 
move beyond the traditional concerns with standard-setting to set meta-standards for core 
implementation and evaluation processes for its member organisations.   
4. Conclusions 
The growing significance of transnational private regulation to the operation of global markets 
requires evaluation both of its forms and of the conditions for its success and legitimacy. On one 
view it is only when linked to governmental organisations in its operations that TPR is likely to be 
legitimate. An alternative view, sketched in this article, is that it may be possible for TPR regimes to 
develop their own sources of legitimacy, both through developing strong technical capacity (for 
example involving rigorous evaluations of implementation and effectiveness, beyond those routinely 
applied by or to public regulators) and through the constructing structures of decision making and 
evaluation which effectively engage a demos associated with the regime, creating an alternative 
source of democratic legitimacy to that of elected governments. Such achievements are challenging 
but not unthinkable. 
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